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The United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child
was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its 841st
Plenary Meeting on November 20, 1959.' While the Declaration is
not legally binding on member states of the United Nations, it
does set out general principles or standards for the special protec-
tion and treatment of children throughout the world.' The Decla-
ration explicitly sets forth the "best interests of the child" as the
paramount purpose for the enactment of laws designed to promote
the health, welfare and security of children.8
International child abduction, even if by a parent or other rel-
ative, is a violation of the rights of children and abhorrent to the
tenets of the Declaration." It is disturbing to a child's need for se-
curity and stability, and seriously disruptive of a child's personal
relationships.5 In addition, the parent from whom the child is
"snatched" endures emotional and financial hardship during the
search for the child.'
There is evidence that the increased mobility of the popula-
tion and the rising rate of separation and divorce in the United
States and other Western countries have contributed to the in-
creased incidence of international child abductions.7 Children ab-
1. G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959).
2. Principle two of the Declaration states:
Principle 2. The child shall enjoy special protection, and shall be given opportu-
nities and facilities, by law and by other means, to enable him to develop physi-
cally, mentally, morally, spiritually and socially in a healthy and normal manner
and in conditions of freedom and dignity. In the enactment of laws for this pur-
pose, the best interest of the child shall be paramount.
Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. Principle 9.
5. See Leo, Kidnapped by Mom or Dad, TIME, July 14, 1980, at 40; S. KATZ, CHILD
SNATCHING (1981).
6. See Noble & Palmer, The Painful Phenomenon of Child Snatching, 65 Soc.
CASEWORK 330 (1984).
7. Note, American and International Responses to International Child Abductions, 16
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 415, 416 nn.4-6 (1984)[hereinafter Responses to International Child
Abductions].
According to Peter H. Pfund, Assistant Legal Advisor for Private International Law,
U.S. State Department, Washington, D.C., there were 677 known cases of child abduction
from the United States as of May 1983. From May 1, 1983 to December 1, 1985, the Depart-
ment of State documented 1,936 cases of children abducted from the United States, or ap-
proximately forty children per month.
According to Pfund, it is difficult to get statistics on the number of children abducted
into the United States from other countries. The estimate from the State Department of
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ducted into this country are difficult to locate because there are no
mandatory national or state registration requirements for children
entering the United States from a foreign country.
Even if the child is located, no assurance exists that the child
will be returned to the parent from whom it was snatched. Many
courts fail to recognize or modify foreign custody decrees in the
name of "best [serving] the interests of the child."8
Ironically, courts which relitigate custody cases "in the best in-
terests of the child" have created an atmosphere of instability
which encourages child-snatching. In child custody determina-
tions, the usual rule of respect for judgments of other courts
gives way to broad judicial discretion to exercise continuing
oversight of the welfare of the child.9
This comment begins with a discussion of the U.S. case law
prior to the enactment of federal legislation to deter parental child
abduction. This discussion is followed by an examination of the
federal statutes,10 and how, in applying this legislation, the U.S.
judicial system operates to encourage international child abduction
by failing to recognize and enforce foreign custody decrees. An
analysis of the case of Cynthia Johns underscores the inadequacies
of existing federal legislation. Cynthia, a Mexican child, was taken
illegally from Mexico by an American couple when she was one day
old. Six years later she was abducted and taken back to Mexico by
her biological mother. Next, the comment looks at the advantages
of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction.
To deter international child abduction, the provisions of the Hague
Convention mandate that the authorities in the abducting country
promptly return the abducted child to the custodial parent or child
care institution." The comment concludes by showing how the
Hague Convention, which limits judicial discretion in these cases,
children abducted into the United States is highly speculative but suggests that there are at
least 15 to 40 per year. Telephone interview with Peter H. Pfund, Esq., Assistant Legal
Advisor for Private International Law, U.S. State Department (Apr. 18, 1986) [hereinafter
Pfund Interview].
8. Peterson, Foreign Country Judgments and the Second Restatement of Conflict of
Laws, 72 COLuM. L. REv. 220, 242 (1972).
9. Note, Law and Treaty Responses to International Child Abductions, 20 VA. J. INT'L
L. 669, 670 (1980).
10. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 9 U.L.A. 111 (1979); 28 U.S.C. § 1738A
(1982)(Fuli faith and credit given to child custody determination); 18 U.S.C. § 1073, as
amended by Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3573.
11. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25,
1980, 19 I.L.M. 1501 [hereinafter Hague Convention]; 51 Fed. Reg. 10,498 (Mar. 26, 1986).
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is a more effective deterrent to child snatching than the federal
legislation now in force.
II. THE UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO CHILD ABDUCTION
A. Pre-Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act Law
Prior to adoption of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act (UCCJA), state courts, in the absence of any national stan-
dard, had virtually unlimited discretion in refusing to recognize or
enforce custody decrees of sister states and foreign nations.12 State
courts assumed jurisdiction on a number of grounds, "including
physical presence of the child, personal jurisdiction over both par-
ents, and domicile of the child."' "s Consequently, two state courts
could simultaneously assert jurisdiction over the parties to a cus-
tody dispute and render inconsistent decrees. The parent who
snatched the child, having physical custody of the child, had the
advantage of being able to "forum shop" by taking the child to a
favorable jurisdiction and then relitigating the custody issue. This
forum shopping was popular because courts tended to give great
weight to the presence of the child in the state when making cus-
tody determinations." Furthermore, if the child snatcher was able
to retain the child for a considerable length of time, the wrongdoer
could argue on the merits that for the child's stability and security,
i.e., the best interests of the child, the child should remain in the
new jurisdiction. As a result, the wrong-doer would be rewarded in
"the best interests of the child."' 5
Before the widespread adoption of the UCCJA state courts
rarely recognized or enforced the custody decrees of sister states,
and even less frequently recognized foreign-nation custody decrees.
In May v. Anderson'6 the Supreme Court held that under the U.S.
Constitution,'1 7 a Wisconsin custody decree obtained by the father
in an ex parte divorce action was not entitled to full faith and
credit by an Ohio court. In another pre-UCCJA case, Kovacs v.
12. Note, supra note 9, at 677.
13. Responses to International Child Abductions, supra note 7, at 419 (quoting RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1971)).
14. See Hoff, Child Snatching: Interstate and International Child Custody Litigation,
in INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES 10 (ABA Monograph, 4th ed.
Mar. 1984).
15. Responses to International Child Abductions, supra note 7, at 419.
16. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
17. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1.
[Vol. 18:2
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION
Brewer, 8 the Court stated that, "the forum state has at least as
much right to disregard, qualify or depart from custody judgment
as does the state where originally rendered."'" Furthermore, in
Ford v. Ford,'0 the Court held that in making a custody determina-
tion, South Carolina was not barred from making its own determi-
nation with respect to the best interests of the child even though
Virginia had already awarded custody on the same basis." Thus,
prior to the widespread adoption of the UCCJA within the United
States, custody decrees of sister states, considered non-final judg-
ments, were not accorded full faith and credit.
Foreign judgments, while never accorded full faith and credit,
have been recognized and enforced on the basis of the principle of
comity. The Supreme Court articulated the principle of comity in
Hilton v. Guyot:1
2
Where there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad
before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial
upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary ap-
pearance of the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence
likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between
the citizens of its own country and those of other countries, and
there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or in the
system of laws under which it is sitting, or fraud in procuring
the judgment or any other special reason why comity of this na-
tion should not allow it full effect, the merits of this case should
not . . . be tried afresh . . . upon the mere assertion of the
party that the judgment was erroneous in law or in fact.2
Comity refers to the willingness to give recognition to the judicial
acts of another sovereign not as a matter of right or obligation, but
as a matter of deference, international courtesy, mutual respect,
and good will. 4 While the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of
Laws incorporates the Hilton comity principle,' 5 the exception to
comity with respect to a child custody decree as a non-final judg-
ment has been noted," thus leaving states "free to shape their own
18. 356 U.S. 604 (1958).
19. Id. at 616.
20. 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
21. Id. at 194.
22. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
23. Id. at 202.
24. Id. at 163-65.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 comment c (1971).
26. Bodenheimer, The International Kidnapping of Children: The United States Ap-
proach, 11 FAM. L.Q. 83, 86 (1977).
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judicial policies in this area of the law." 7 Prior to the adoption of
the UCCJA in some form by all states, even if a court recognized a
foreign custody decree, it was free not to enforce it. With few nota-
ble exceptions, state courts have chosen to litigate child custody
cases rather than enforce the decrees of foreign nations.28
There are several reasons for not giving full faith and credit to
a sister state's custody decree, as well as for disregarding the com-
ity principle in international child custody disputes. First, the full
faith and credit doctrine may not be applied because custody de-
crees are not final judgments and may be modified at any time
based on changed circumstances which require a de novo custody
determination in the best interests of the child. A second reason,
particularly relevant to state courts' reluctance to enforce foreign
nation courts' custody decrees, is that the judge in the later action
may disagree with or mistrust the prior award. Judges in the
United States have been particularly unwilling to enforce foreign
custody awards when they suspect the awards are not in accord
with their own notion of what constitutes the best interests of the
child.29 Third, some judges are "loathe to defer to courts of other
states."30 Judges may also tend to be more receptive to the parent
who is a local resident and is present with the child. 1 Finally,
judges and attorneys become emotionally involved in the custody
dilemma and irrationally cling to a belief that "if we cannot divide
the child by sword [as King Solomon proposed] we can divide him
by periods of time through the free and easy modifiability of the
custody decree of the original court."32
The modern American trend toward joint custody awards may
well be unrealistic in the judicial resolution of international child
custody disputes. The child needs, and in fact deserves, a judicial
determination securing for him the stability of a single home with
at least one parent. This can best be effected by custody arrange-
ments which are subject to modification only by the court making
the original custody determination, and then only when necessary
to accommodate a substantial change of circumstances." Such ju-
27. Note, supra note 9, at 674.
28. See id. at 673.
29. Bodenheimer, supra note 27, at 83.
30. Id. at 84 & n.3 (citing Address by Justice Fairchild of the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin, Conference of Chief Justices at 8 (St. Louis, Aug. 1961)).
31. Bodenheimer, supra note 27, at 84.
32. Id. at 84-85.
33. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A.J. SOLNrT, BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
[Vol. 18:2
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dicial determinations should not preclude the non-custodial parent
from having frequent access to the child and as much sharing as is
geographically feasible."
Prior to a state's adoption of the UCCJA, international child
abduction case determinations were unpredictable. Even where the
clean hands rule should have been applied to prevent a child
snatcher from benefiting from his wrong-doing, it was not consist-
ently used. In State v. ex rel. Domico v. Domico,"5 the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeal, on the mother's habeas petition,
refused to honor a German custody decree, awarding custody to
the mother even though there was evidence the father had forcibly
removed the children from her custody. The court decided to reli-
tigate the case on the merits. Courts have traditionally required
the parent seeking to modify a custody decree to show change of
circumstances; the court in this instance, however, required the
mother, who was seeking to enforce the West German decree un-
changed, to show "changed circumstances" in order to regain cus-
tody. 6 The court denied the mother's petition to regain custody,
holding that:
[Because the mother] was not as well off financially as the re-
spondent, since his income is four or five times more than her
income ... [t]o remove the children from one country to an-
other ... to subject them to different customs in this formative
period of their lives would appear, from the evidence in this case
against their welfare and best interest.37
The court, by awarding custody to the father, in effect rewarded
him for child-snatching. 8
Contrary to the holding in Domico, the Connecticut Supreme
(1973).
34. Bodenheimer, supra note 27, at 85.
35. 153 W. Va. 695, 172 S.E.2d 805 (1970).
36. Id. at 704, 172 S.E.2d at 810.
37. Id.
38. In an impassioned dissent, J. Calhoun pointed out that the court had "miscon-
strued the. . . question of comity. . . and. . . has misconceived pertinent legal principles
which should be applied in this case.... [andl has done great violence to basic equitable
considerations." Id. at 811 (Calhoun, J., dissenting).
Judge Calhoun went on to emphatically state that, "[I1f ever a litigant came into court
with unclean hands to seek equitable relief, it was this respondent." Id. "The ingenious,
reprehensible [child snatching] scheme conceived and commenced in West Germany has, by




Court of Errors in Adamsen v. Adamsen,39 upheld a Norwegian
court's grant of custody to the father. In this case, the court con-
cluded that, unlike the situation in Domico, the change in circum-
stances following the abduction had been to the child's detriment.
The Adamsen trial court decision, like that in Domico, was not
based on an application of the comity principle: "It was an inde-
pendent adjudication after a full hearing rather than the enforce-
ment of the foreign judgment. ' 40 As in Adamsen and Domico the
majority of U.S. state courts, especially in pre-UCCJA cases, did
not apply comity principles, but made de novo custody determina-
tions based on their view of what was in the "best interest of the
child," even where a foreign court already had made such a deter-
mination.4 1 The victimized parent was thus forced to relitigate the
entire custody matter on the merits.
The New York Supreme Court followed the minority view of
U.S. state courts, applying principles of comity in Lang v. Lang.2
Lang held that New York courts should recognize and enforce for-
eign custody awards absent a showing of extraordinary circum-
stances proving that otherwise the child would suffer. 3 In this
case, a Swiss court had awarded custody of two children to the
father. The mother fled with the children to New York for the pur-
pose of frustrating the Swiss decree. The father filed a writ of
habeas corpus petition in New York for the return of custody of
the children. 44 The New York court granted the father's petition,
basing its decision on principles of comity. The court stated:
Adherence to the principle of comity provides the key to ra-
tional disposition for the welfare of the children ... in many, if
not most, custody cases involving self-help .... Not only does
self-help make the eventual placement of the children an arbi-
trary consequence but it breeds reprisal in kind. 41
B. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
The purpose of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
39. 151 Conn. 172, 195 A.2d 418 (1963).
40. Id. at 180, 195 A.2d at 422.
41. See, e.g., Rzeszotarski v. Rzeszotarski, 296 A.2d 431 (D.C. 1972); see also Baran-
shamaje v. Baranshamaje, 7 Farn. L. Rep. (BNA) 2134 (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 26, 1980).
42. 9 A.D.2d 401, 193 N.Y.S.2d 763 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959).
43. Id. at 406, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
44. Id. at 404, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 766.
45. Id. at 408, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 770.
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(UCCJA) is to deter parental child abduction by limiting jurisdic-
tion of custody matters to courts of one state thereby preventing
multiple custody litigation.' As of this writing, all of the states in
the U.S. have adopted the UCCJA in some form.' Under the Act,
a court is permitted to assert jurisdiction over a custody matter
only if (1) the state is the "home state" of the child at the time the
proceeding commences; (2) there is a significant connection be-
tween the child and at least one custodian of the state; (3) the
child is physically present in the state and has been abandoned, or
is in immediate need of protection from abuse or neglect; or (4) no
other state would be able to assert jurisdiction under (1), (2), or
(3)48 The UCCJA sets out uniform criteria for the selection of the
appropriate forum for recognition and enforcement of out-of-state
custody decrees. 4 Sections of the Act prohibit a second court from
assuming jurisdiction once litigation has commenced in another
state and require the state to which the abducting parent flees to
decline jurisdiction based on the clean hands principle.50 Thus, as
was the case in most of the pre-UCCJA custody determinations
discussed previously, the UCCJA codified the "clean hands" prin-
ciple in an attempt to prevent the child snatcher from benefiting
46. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 9 U.L.A. 111 (1979).
Section 1 provides that the general purposes of the Act are to (1) avoid jurisdictional
competition between state court; (2) promote cooperation between courts so that the state
that can best decide the case in the interests of the child has jurisdiction; (3) deter abduc-
tions undertaken to obtain custody awards; and (4) facilitate enforcement of out-of-state
custody decrees. Id. § 1.
47. See Hoff, supra note 14.
48. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act § 3a.
49. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act §§ 7, 8. Sections 7 and 8 of the UCCJA
address the question of jurisdiction. Section 7 allows a court to decline jurisdiction upon a
finding of "forum non conveniens." Section 8 permits the court if decline jurisdiction of the
petitioner comes to the court with "unclean hands," i.e. has abducted, or otherwise improp-
erly retained the child from the custodial parent.
Section 8 (Jurisdiction Declined by Reason of Conduct] states:
(a) If the petitioner for an initial decree has wrongfully taken the child from
another state or has engaged in similar reprehensible conduct the court may de-
cline to exercise jurisdiction if this is just and proper under the circumstances.
(b) Unless required in the interest of the child, the court shall not exercise
its jurisdiction to modify a custody decree of another state if the petitioner,
without consent of the person entitled to custody, has improperly removed the
child from the physical custody of the person entitled to custody or has improp-
erly retained the child after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of physi-
cal custody. If the petitioner has violated any other provision of a custody decree
of another state, the court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if this is just
and proper under the circumstances. ...




The general provisions of the UCCJA apply with equal force
to international child custody disputes by virtue of Section 23 of
the Act.5 ' Comity is granted, provided all parties to the action are
afforded reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. Under
Section 23, foreign courts have jurisdiction under their own laws
which may or may not comport with the jurisdictional require-
ments of Section 3, previously discussed. Under the Act, American
courts have declined jurisdiction in situations where the foreign fo-
rum had "closer connections" with the child. Jurisdiction has also
been declined where the parent seeking custody had wrongfully
taken the child, thereby falling under the "clean hands" provision.
Many international custody dispute determinations made
under the UCCJA have been based on comity principles. In In re
Marriage of Ben- Yehoshua,2 the wife, a U.S. citizen, and her Is-
raeli husband were married in Israel and domiciled there for thir-
teen years. The wife, thereafter, took the couple's three children to
California, where she filed suit for both separation from her hus-
band and custody of their children. 5 Before the California pro-
ceedings had continued beyond an initial hearing, the father
snatched the children and returned to Israel.14 The husband filed
for divorce and was awarded custody of the children in Israel.55
The California Court of Appeal found that the trial court had erro-
neously equated personal jurisdiction over the parties with subject
matter jurisdiction over the custody of the children.56 Moreover,
the home state jurisdiction prerequisite of the UCCJA was not sat-
isfied because the children had only been in California for one
month; Israel was the state with maximum contacts. 57 Apparently,
given the circumstances, the clean hands doctrine was not invoked;
otherwise, California could have retained jurisdiction.
51. Id. at § 23. Section 23 states:
The general policies of the Act extend to the international area. The provisions
of this Act relating to the recognition and enforcement of custody decrees of
other states apply to custody decrees and decrees involving legal institutions
similar in nature to custody institutions rendered by appropriate authorities of
other nations if reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard were given to all
affected persons.
52. 91 Cal. App. 3d 259, 154 Cal. Rptr. 80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
53. Id. at 262, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 82.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 264, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
57. Id. 266-67, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 84-85.
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Unlike Ben-Yehoshua where no custody determination was
made, in Woodhouse v. District Court,58 the Colorado court ap-
plied comity principles in recognizing the continuing jurisdiction of
the British court. The court refused to modify an English custody
decree awarding the mother custody of her two children. The fa-
ther, who by virtue of the British decree was awarded visitation,
moved to the U.S. and snatched the child. Despite a 1978 British
court order demanding the child's return, the father refused to re-
turn the child. The Colorado Supreme Court overruled the trial
court's award of custody to the father, stating that, "the Act de-
mands that an English court determine whether there should be a
modification of its custody decree." 5' Having found no emergency
situation endangering the child's safety or welfare, the court con-
cluded that, "the Act clearly intended to limit the discretion of the
respondent court in this type of situation." 0 Absent a dangerous
threat or the probability of serious harm to the child by the parent
awarded custody by a foreign tribunal, comity principles dictate
that modification of decrees are not within the jurisdiction of the
state into which the child was abducted.
Despite the adoption of the UCCJA, American courts have not
always respected the jurisdiction of foreign courts. Unlike the deci-
sions in Ben-Yehoshua and Woodhouse, the New Hampshire court
in Brauch v. Shaw,61 assumed jurisdiction over the custody issue,
"in the best interest of the child" '62 even though the petitioner (fa-
ther) had unlawfully snatched his son from his mother in England.
Noting that the primary purpose of the UCCJA is to "discourage
• ..child-napping, '63 the New Hampshire court recognized that it
should decline jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the New Hampshire court
assumed jurisdiction, rationalizing that shipping the child back to
England would have harmful effects on the child by disrupting his
environment."4
In deciding whether to assume jurisdiction or enforce a prior
foreign decree, Brauch makes clear that the discretion allowed trial
judges under the UCCJA weakens the Act's effectiveness in deter-
ring parental child abduction. The Act does not require states to
58. 196 Colo. 558, 587 P.2d 1199 (1978).
59. Id. at 560, 587 P.2d at 1201.
60. Id.
61. 121 N.H. 562, 432 A.2d 1 (1981).
62. Id. at 574, 432 A.2d at 7.
63. Id. at 571, 432 A.2d at 6.
64. Id. at 573, 432 A.2d at 7.
1986]
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give full faith and credit to all foreign decrees but only requires
that they recognize and enforce foreign custody decrees in accor-
dance with specified jurisdictional guidelines. 5 Furthermore, as
Brauch illustrates, the UCCJA does not punish the abducting par-
ent. In most cases, strict application of the UCCJA effectively bars
the parent who steals a child from obtaining jurisdiction in the
state to which he flees. In Brauch, however, the state court where
the abducting parent fled assumed jurisdiction, thus nullifying the
deterrent effect of the Act. Finally, if the abducting parent chooses
not to seek custody and remains "underground," the parent and
the child fall outside the purview of the UCCJA."
C. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980
The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act"' (PKPA) was en-
acted to correct some of the weaknesses of the UCCJA. The
PKPA's primary purpose is "to deter interstate abductions and
other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain custody
and visitation awards."' 8 Essentially, this federal act requires the
appropriate authorities of every state to enforce rather than mod-
ify custody and visitation orders made by courts already exercising
jurisdiction. The Act has three main aspects.6 First and foremost,
the full faith and credit mandate is specific with reference to prior
custody decrees and orders. 0 Although the PKPA does not extend
to international cases, it does not conflict with section 23 of the
UCCJA.71 Thus, judicial discretion is limited to prevent results like
those in Brauch which was decided under the UCCJA. If the
PKPA had been applied to Brauch instead of the UCCJA, then
the English custody decree awarding the mother custody would
have been given full faith and credit. Thus, New Hampshire courts
would have had to recognize and enforce the English decree and
return the snatched child to the mother-a result opposite to the
one reached by the New Hampshire courts.
65. See Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act § 3.
66. Foster & Freed, A Legislative Beginning to Child-Snatching Prevention, TRIAL,
Apr. 1981, at 36.
67. See Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3573.
68. Id. § 7.
69. Foster & Freed, supra note 66, at 37.
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982); see also Hoff, supro note 14.
71. Responses to International Child Abductions, supra note 7, at 433-34. See also
Hoff, supra note 14, at 10-11.
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Second, the PKPA provides for the use of federal and state
parent locator services which are now available in child support
cases. 7 Federal and state locator services permit parent-victims of
limited means who cannot afford private detectives to avail them-
selves of the services of trained federal or state detectives and in-
vestigators to assist in locating a snatched child.
Finally, the PKPA expands the Fugitive Felon Act to include
child snatching as a felony where interstate or international flight
is involved.73 "In addition to making the new federal law operative,
raising child snatching to felony status better assures favorable re-
sults in extraditions.' One commentator notes that "while the
possibility of extradition may well operate as a deterrent to paren-
tal kidnapping, the purpose of extradition is to bring back the par-
ent, not the child. Once the child is returned, it is probable that
the state will decline extradition. ' 75 According to some authorities,
"the main reason status as a felony is needed for parental kidnap-
ping is to . . .aid extradition and trigger FBI assistance. ' '76
In international child snatching cases, the PKPA's full faith
and credit provision is essential for the mandatory recognition and
enforcement of valid foreign nation custody decrees. If the PKPA
full faith and credit provision were applicable to foreign custody
decrees, it is more likely that a custodial parent from a foreign
country would be better able to enforce a custody order against an
abducting non-custodial parent, as has been the case in interstate
child custody disputes under the PKPA.77 According to the Act,
72. Id.; see The Child Support Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 663 (1982).
73. Foster & Freed, supra note 66.
74. Id. at 38.
75. Pfund Interview, supra note 7.
76. Foster & Freed, supra note 66, at 38. See also Responses to International Child
Abduction, supra note 7, at 433.
77. See Hoff, Federal Court Remedies in Interstate Child Custody and Parental Kid-
napping Cases, 19 FAM. L.Q. 443 (1986) [hereinafter Hoff, Federal Court Remedies]. Hoff
focuses on the increased involvement of federal courts in enforcing the PKPA § 1738A full
faith and credit provision in interstate child custody disputes.
Recent cases have affirmatively held that federal question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. §
1331) lies to enforce compliance with the PKPA when a state court violates § 1738A. Id. at
444.
The Flood court determined that two traditional bars to federal involvement in
child custody disputes do not apply to suits under § 1738A. The court held that
the domestic relations exception, which applies to diversity jurisdiction, 28
U.S.C. § 1332 does not apply to cases based on federal question jurisdiction, and
thus would not bar an action brought under PKPA. Next, the court distin-
guished the federal action brought pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the U.S. Constitution (Article IV, Section 1) for enforcement of custody de-
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"indeed, courts should consider the strong anti-snatching and pro-
stability policies embodied in the PKPA when making a decision
in an international custody dispute. '7 8
III. THE CASE OF CYNTHIA JOHNS, MEXICAN ALIEN #A
21324657 7
The tragic case of Cynthia Johns brings into focus the pressing
need for international comity in arriving at swift custody determi-
nations in international child custody disputes if the best interests
of the child are to be served. Cynthia, a Mexican alien girl, was
brought into this country illegally from Mexico by an American
couple when she was one-day old and abducted back to Mexico six
years later by her biological mother. This unprecedented case of
child abduction, treated by the U.S. courts as a parental kidnap-
ping, was reviewed over a six-year period, from 1976 to 1982, by
Immigration and Naturalization Service Directors in two states,80
an immigration judge,6 ' a Board of Immigration Appeals,"2 Florida
crees, from actions seeking a determination as to whether a state has improperly
exercised jurisdiction in a custody case in violation of § 1738A. Actions seeking
compliance with the PKPA would turn on an analysis of the jurisdictional facts
... There would be no inquiry into substantive custody law ...
Id. at 444-46 (Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1984)).
78. Responses to International Child Abduction, supra note 7, at 434.
79. See generally Johns v. Department of Justice, 624 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1980); and
Johns v. Department of Justice, 653 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1981).
80. See Hearings and Rulings of INS: U.S. Department of Justice, Deportation Pro-
ceedings, Immigration and Naturalization Service; In re: The Matter of Cynthia Johns, INS
File No. A-21-324-657, (San Francisco, Cal. Jan. 24, 1977).
Charles E. Hoffman, Assistant Director of Immigration and Naturalization Service, San
Francisco, California, issued an Order of Deportation and Order to Show Cause on Cynthia
Johns on October 4, 1976 after investigating Mrs. Macias-Rosales' claim. Appendix of Brief
of Intervenor, Angela Macias-Rosales, Johns v. Department of Justice, 624 F.2d 522 (5th
Cir. 1980).
Raymond A. Morris, District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Miami,
Florida issued a subsequent Order for Deportation for Cynthia Johns in February, 1980 and
subsequently granted a stay of deportation by not reinstating deportation proceedings pend-
ing a resolution of the custody dispute in state court. Appendix to Brief of Intervenor, An-
gela Macias-Rosales, Johns v. Department of Justice, 624 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1980).
81. In Deportation Proceedings, In the Matter of Cynthia Johns, Respondent, INS File
No. A-21-324-657 (San Francisco, Cal. Dec. 18, 1977) (J. Sipkin)(termination of proceedings
pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982)). See also
Appendix to Brief of Intervenor, Angela Macias-Rosales, Johns v. Department of Justice,
624 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1980).
82. Department of Justice, Board of Immigration Appeals, In Deportation Proceedings,
In re: Cynthia Elizabeth Johns, File No. A 21-324-657 (San Francisco, Cal. Feb. 27, 1979)
pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(motion for reconsid-
eration of deportation denied).
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trial courts"3 and appellate courts,8 ' and federal district" and ap-
pellate courts8s No final custody determination was reached, how-
ever, in any court of law. The UCCJA which was in force during
the Johns proceedings and which was aimed at preventing or re-
ducing the incidence of child abduction, proved ineffective.
A. Facts and Procedural Background of the Johns Case
On October 22, 1975, an American couple, Mark and Eileen
Johns, brought into the United States a one-day old female infant
born in Baja California, Mexico to Angela Macias-Rosales. It is un-
disputed that the Johnses crossed the border into the United
States without a visa or proper documentation for the immigration
of a foreign-born child. They gave officials at the border a pink
paper which indicated they had registered the child. On her Mexi-
can Birth Certificate (Acta de Nacimiento) the Johnses named the
alien child Cynthia Elizabeth Johns. The couple registered the
child as if they were her natural parents. They claimed this regis-
tration constituted a legal adoption in Baja California, Mexico.
Throughout the subsequent proceedings, Mrs. Macias-Rosales
claimed she was Cynthia's mother and that the child had been kid-
napped from her in Tijuana, Mexico. The Johnses claimed that the
baby was "given" to them by Mrs. Macias-Rosales in what they
claimed to be a "black market" adoption transaction: they had
taken the child from Mexico with the knowledge and consent of
the mother. In other words, Mrs. Macias-Rosales claimed that the
child had been kidnapped, and the Johnses argued that there had
been a "de facto" (black market) adoption s7
83. In re: Custody of Cynthia Johns, No. 80-18409 FC (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Feb. 5, 1981);
In re: Adoption of: Cynthia Elizabeth Johns by: Mark Johns and Eileen Johns, No. 76-6481
FC 08 (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed May 9, 1979).
84. See also state custody cases, unpublished: In re: Custody of Cynthia Johns, Macias-
Rosales v. Klein, No. 81-949 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 1981)(dismissed Oct. 19, 1981).
85. Macias-Rosales v. Department of Justice, No. 79-2823-Civ-JE (S.D. Fla. June,
1979); Johns v. Department of Justice, No. 80-480-Civ-JWK (S.D. Fla. Feb. 20, 1980); Ma-
cias-Rosales v. Department of Justice, No. 79-2823-Civ-JE, slip op. (S.D. Fla. June
1979)(Eaton, J.); Johns v. Department of Justice, No. 80-480-Civ-JWK, slip op. (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 20, 1980).
86. Johns v. Department of Justice, 624 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1980); Johns v. Department
of Justice, 653 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1981).
87. The Mexican Government agreed with Mrs. Macias-Rosales and declared the adop-
tion illegal. The Mexican Government subsequently issued a warrant for the arrest of the
Johnses for kidnapping. Original and certified English translation of Arrest Warrant issued
by the Third Penal Court, Tijuana, Baja California, Mexico, issued December 1, 1978, pur-
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It was not until January 29, 1976, that Cynthia's biological
mother, Mrs. Macias-Rosales, having finally located the Johnses
and Cynthia in California, contacted the INS.8 Mrs. Macias-
Rosales claimed that her child had been kidnapped by the
couple. 89 Her action prompted an INS investigation.
1. INS Investigation and Proceedings in California
On October 4, 1976, when Cynthia was less than a year old,
the INS issued an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing to
the Johnses, alleging that Cynthia, having entered the country ille-
gally, was subject to deportation. Formal hearings were held on Oc-
tober 28, 1976 and November 5, 1976.
On January 24, 1977, an immigration judge issued an interloc-
utory order in which he found Cynthia to be deportable pursuant
suant to Article 317, Part VI of the Penal Code, Plagiarism on a twelve year old minor,
Exhibit 21, found in Reply Brief of Appellants, Mark David Johns and Eileen May Johns,
Johns v. Department of Justice, 624 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1980).
88. Johns v. Department of Justice, 624 F.2d 522, 523 (5th Cir. 1980).
89. Throughout this case, great significance has been attached to Mrs. Macias-Rosales'
unexplained delay in contacting the Mexican authorities after she discovered her baby was
missing. She herself could not explain the initial delay. Mrs. Macias-Rosales stated in an
interview, "I am not ignorant. I am not stupid. To this day I do not know why I did not go
to the authorities. But at that moment I was not thinking." (She did go to the border by
taxi from the hospital in an effort to retrieve the child there.) "I was lost. I wanted to cry,
but there were no tears. There was pain where I was bleeding. . . I thought they would be
stopped at the border, but they were not there. I came home from the border alone." Blais,
Mexican Standoff, Miami Herald (Tropic Magazine), Nov. 30, 1980, 11-20, 27-30, 57, 58,
[hereinafter Tropic Magazine].
What is clear from the record is that while Mrs. Macias-Rosales spoke with hospital
staff, she left her baby in the care of a "friend" named de Leon. Mark Johns, identifying
himself as a Dr. Marcos, told de Leon that he was to take the baby and left a piece of paper
with that name and a non-existent Miami address on it. This paper is one of the few pieces
of physical evidence in this strange and tragic case of child abduction. Tropic Magazine,
supra.
Judge Sipkin, the immigration judge in California, stated that in his opinion (without
any concrete evidence), the reason for Mrs. Macias-Rosales' delay in contacting the authori-
ties was that, "she had a deal going with the Johns and was trying to collect her money." In
Deportation Proceedings, In the Matter of Cynthia Johns, INS File No. A-21-324-657 (San
Francisco, Cal. Jan. 24, 1977), found in Appendix to Brief of Intervenor, at A9, Johns v.
Department of Justice, 624 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1980)(interlocutory deportation order).
Judge Sipkin continued:
[T]he testimony of the child's mother concerning what occurred in the hospital
does not ring true. As she gave the facts she could only think the child had been
abducted. Unless a deal was in progress, she would have raised hell. . . She not
only did not notify the police, but attempted to locate the Johnses by herself
and even after she located them, she did nothing for another month.
Id. at A8-A9.
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION
to 8 U.S.C. section 241 (a)(1), but withheld his final order for de-
portation to allow the natural mother to bring custody proceedings
in the California state court.90 In issuing the interlocutory order
Judge Sipkin stated:
Neither the Johnses nor the mother have clean hands. Conse-
quently, I do not feel that either are deserving of any particular
sympathy. It is only the welfare of the child which is of impor-
tance. Sending her back to Mexico is not necessarily in her best
interests. Unfortunately in the present posture of the case my
authority to do anything else is limited. 1
Concluding that Mrs. Macias-Rosales' petition for habeas corpus
had been denied in the civil court in California, but not on the
merits, Judge Sipkin issued a final order of deportation in Decem-
ber, 1977.92
Further INS proceedings followed, including an appeal by the
Johnses on behalf of Cynthia to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), requesting the INS to reconsider its deportation order of
December 1978. The motion was denied in February 1979. One
month before the BIA ruling, the Johnses fled with Cynthia to
Florida.
2. Florida Proceedings
(a) INS and State Court Proceedings. On March 20, 1979, the
INS District Director for Miami, Florida granted the Johnses a
temporary stay of Cynthia's deportation while they petitioned
Florida's Eleventh Circuit Court, Dade County, Florida, to adopt
Cynthia. A petition for adoption was filed on May 5, 1979.9s
(b) Proceedings in the Federal District Court: Macias-Rosales
v. Department of Justice. In June, 1979, the child's natural
90. In Deportation Proceedings, In the Matter of Cynthia Johns, INS File No. A-21-
324-567 (San Francisco, Cal., Jan. 24, 1977). See Tropic Magazine, supra note 89.
It is significant that although the mother located the child in October 1976, when
Cynthia was less than a year old, she was over two years old when Sipkin issued his final
order of deportation on December 18, 1977.
91. Appendix to Brief of Intervenor, Mrs. Angela Macias-Rosales, at A10, Johns v. De-
partment of Justice, 624 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1980).
92. Id. at A12.
93. In re: Custody of Cynthia Johns, No. 80-18409 FC (lth Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Feb. 5,
1981).
In re: Custody of Cynthia Johns, Angela Macias-Rosales v. Klein, No. 81-949 (3d Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. June 1981). The case was dismissed Oct. 19, 1981 after Mrs. Macias-Rosales
took Cynthia and left the United States.
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mother, Mrs. Macias-Rosales, filed suit for habeas corpus manda-
mus and money damages in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida.' The Johnses moved for an order
enjoining the INS from deporting the child. The trial court granted
the biological mother a temporary injunction, restraining the
Johnses from proceeding with the state court adoption and declin-
ing to enjoin the INS from deporting the child.
On January 30, 1980, the District Director of INS rescinded an
earlier stay of deportation and issued a warrant for Cynthia's de-
portation to Mexico. When the Johnses failed to surrender
Cynthia, she was taken into INS custody.9 5
(c) Proceedings in the Federal District Court: Johns v. De-
partment of Justice. The couple filed a suit in federal court seek-
ing to enjoin deportation and to obtain a writ of habeas corpus.
Mrs. Macias-Rosales sought to intervene."6 The district court dis-
missed the Johnses' complaint with prejudice and denied Mrs. Ma-
cias-Rosales' motion to intervene, but did not rule on her habeas
petition. 
7
(d) Appeal of Johns in the Fifth Circuit. The Johnses ap-
pealed the judgment of the district court to the Fifth Circuit U.S.
Court of Appeals and Mrs. Macias-Rosales was permitted by the
appellate court to intervene. The court ruled that:
Because the child has not been represented by a guardian ad
litem, we reverse the district court, direct it to issue a prelimi-
nary injunction against execution of the deportation order, and
remand the case for the appointment of a guardian ad litem and
for further proceedings contradictorily with that person. 8
94. Macias-Rosales v. Department of Justice, No. 79-2823-Civ-JE, slip op. (S.D. Fla.
June, 1979).
95. Johns v. Department of Justice, 653 F.2d 884, 886 (5th Cir. 1981).
Cynthia was taken from the Johnses and placed in an institution under the care of
Catholic Services Bureau for what was to have been a period of 48-72 hours pending her
deportation from Mexico. Because of subsequent legal proceedings, her institutional care
continued until March 1981, when her guardian ad litem, Mr. Klein, was permitted by the
federal district court to have Cynthia placed with a foster family. Id. at 888.
In the view of this writer, Cynthia's placement with a Catholic agency was not "acciden-
tal." The Johnses are Jewish, and placement with a Catholic agency signified a growing
recognition by the government that the child was the daughter of Mrs. Macias-Rosales, a
Catholic, Indian mother.
96. Id. at 893.
97. Id. at 895.
98. Johns v. Department of Justice, 624 F.2d 522, 523 (5th Cir. 1980). Florida attorneys
Rebekah Poston and Theodore Klein were subsequently appointed guardians ad litem by
the federal district court. It was Mr. Klein alone who appears to have represented Cynthia.
[Vol. 18:2
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It was not until this appellate court ruling that the issue of the
Johnses' legal status as parents able to represent Cynthia's best
interest was put to rest. The appellate court noted that while the
Johnses purported to represent both themselves and Cynthia's in-
terests, their interests and Cynthia's were not necessarily the same.
The court explained that, "[the Johnses] patently [lacked) legal
standing to represent her [Cynthia], being neither her natural nor
her adoptive parents and having no custody order."99 The court
also considered Mrs. Macias-Rosales' ability to represent Cynthia's
interests and noted that while it appeared to be undisputed that
Mrs. Macias-Rosales was Cynthia's mother and that her personal
interest commanded sympathy, she, like the Johnses, did not nec-
essarily represent Cynthia's interests. The court reasoned that:
Cynthia has been raised in a different culture, speaks a different
language, has resided for all but the first twenty-four hours of
her life with another family and would, if deported, presumably
be taken to Mrs. Macias-Rosales' home to reside with two older
siblings who have never seen her and with whom she could not
communicate. Under these circumstances, Mrs. Macias-Rosales
does not necessarily represent Cynthia's interests.00
The appellate court, citing to the Biblical story of King Solomon,
distinguished the Johns case from the tale of Solomon's wisdom in
resolving the disputed parentage between two mothers:10 1
The celebrated wise king could assume, however, that the true
mother had interests identical to those of the infant. Here we
cannot assume that either Mrs. Macias-Rosales or the Johns[es]
seek to protect only the interests of Cynthia. In this unusual sit-
uation, it was a denial of due process to hold proceedings to de-
port an unrepresented infant incapable of representing
herself. 02
The appellate court reversed the federal trial court's dismissal of
the Johnses' petition to stay the deportation proceedings; the court
remanded the case with instructions to the federal district court to
appoint a guardian ad litem to represent Cynthia in the INS de-
portation proceedings to insure her due process.103
Henceforth, he will be referred to as Cynthia's guardian ad litem.
99. Id. at 523-24.
100. Id. at 524.
101. 1 Kings 3:16-28.




Recognizing the harm being done to Cynthia by the aforemen-
tioned protracted legal proceedings and in order to avoid further
delays, the appellate court ordered that all INS proceedings be
completed within sixty days, i.e. by September 30, 1980, and all
proceedings of the district court be completed thirty days thereaf-
ter (October 30, 1980), unless those limits were extended by the
appellate court itself.1 04 The Fifth Circuit panel retained jurisdic-
tion of any further appeals. 05
(e) Proceedings on Remand. Despite the appellate court rul-
ings requiring an expedited disposition of the deportation and fed-
eral district court proceedings, the case continued for almost an-
other year, without a resolution by the INS or the federal district
court. During this time, pursuant to the appellate court instruc-
tions, a guardian ad litem, Mr. Theodore Klein, was appointed by
the federal district court on August 6, 1980.01
From August 6, 1980 to August 4, 1981, Cynthia continued to
be the victim of further delays as the legal proceedings continued.
On November 12, 1980, a "stay of deportation" proceedings was
granted by the INS director, at the request of the guardian ad li-
tern, until a determination of the child's custody could be made in
Florida state court.107 In response to the INS "stay," or more accu-
rately the agreement by the INS directors to refrain from institut-
ing further deportation proceedings, Mrs. Macias-Rosales filed a
motion requesting the federal district court to order Cynthia's de-
portation, or in the alternative to order "the INS to release the
child forthwith to the natural mother" contending that the INS
was "without further authority to detain the child." ' The Johnses
opposed the mother's petition and asked the district court to order
Cynthia released to them. 0 9 The Johnses' petition was denied
while no ruling on Mrs. Macias-Rosales' petition was made.
While the Johnses and Mrs. Macias-Rosales were battling over
Cynthia's custody in federal court, Cynthia's guardian ad litem
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Johns v. Department of Justice, 653 F.2d 884, 886 (5th Cir. 1981).
107. Id. at 877.
108. Id.
109. Id. It is important to note that, initially, the Johnses' and Mrs. Macias-Rosales'
habeas petitions were being heard by two different district court judges in the same federal
district. These proceedings were consolidated in 1981 when the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals recognized the potential for contradictory determinations and further delay. Id. at
896.
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filed a custody proceeding in the Family Division of the Florida
State trial court "to determine the legal custody of Cynthia
[Johns]." ' Mrs. Macias-Rosales, opposing Mr. Klein's petition,
110. In re: Custody of Cynthia Johns, No. 80-18409 FC (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Feb. 5,1981).
Cynthia's guardian ad litem, Mr. Klein, requested and obtained the trial court's author-
ization to conduct psychological evaluations of all the parties and to have home studies of
the battling parents. The psychological evaluation of Mrs. Macias-Rosales indicated that she
was a "fit" parent. The home study of Mrs. Macias-Rosales also indicated that she was not
in fact married to Cynthia's father, who was already married and, presumably, unable to
obtain a divorce. It was also discovered that, in addition to two young children whom she
acknowledged, Mrs. Macias-Rosales had two older children residing with her mother. See
Tropic Magazine, supra note 89, at 29-30, 58.
While the information regarding Mrs. Macias-Rosales may have raised some questions
regarding her veracity and the legal status of her relationship with Cynthia's father, the
questions raised by the investigation regarding the Johnses' suitability as parents were
much more serious. Eileen Johns' sister testified on deposition that her sister was mentally
retarded and quite gullible. Eileen Johns' sister also testified, and Mark Johns himself ad-
mitted, that although he was not a physician, he passed himself off as one and even had
stationery printed, "Mark D. Johns, M.D." Id. at 18-19.
On deposition, Mr. Johns also claimed to have a bachelor's degree from Columbia Uni-
versity, but the registrar at Columbia University wrote that no such degree was ever issued
to a Mark David Johns. From testimony of Mr. Johns and others, and from physical evi-
dence, it is clear that Mark David Johns often lied without compunction, showing contempt
for those who trusted and believed in him as well as for the legal system. See Tropic Maga-
zine, supra note 89. This picture of Mr. Johns appeared early in the investigation of this
case. The following statement was made by Mary Lou Lustig, INS investigator, on Septem-
ber 1, 1976:
Subject Mark Johns has continued to heap lie upon lie during the entire course
of this investigation.
It is unfortunate that the prosecution of Mark Johns was declined. This
Service [the INS] must not allow individuals such as the conniving subject Mark
Johns to knowingly and flagrantly break the federal laws of this country.
See Tropic Magazine, supra note 89, at 28 (quoting from the deposition of Mary Lou Lustig,
Sept. 1, 1976).
When the Johnses petitioned to adopt Cynthia in May, 1979, Donna Silverman of the
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services conducted an extensive home study of
the Johnses. She concluded that the couple was unsuitable as adoptive parents. Id. at 30.
Silverman's report included an investigation of the allegation by Eileen Johns' sister
that Mr. Johns was a homosexual whose sexual activities were conducted in the home. The
investigation proved inconclusive. However, in a private interview with Eileen Johns, "she
admitted that her husband did have several nude pictures of a male friend who stays in
their home." Id.
The HRS report also noted the Johnses' financial instability. At the time of the study,
Johns was employed as a chemical analyst earning $300.00 per week. Johns claimed also to
own and operate a nutrition consulting business, listing his qualifications as a "degree" in
healthology from Ventura, California. In addition, Johns is being sued by a number of chiro-
practors in California who claim he sold or leased them medical and laboratory equipment
not available for use to chiropractors under state law. Johns told them he was a physician
and that he had arranged for them to legally use the equipment. Id. at 20, 28.
HRS interviews with neighbors also yielded mixed results regarding the Johnses' treat-
ment of Cynthia. Some neighbors reported that the Johnses appeared to be doting parents,
especially Mr. Johns. Other neighbors reported that Cynthia was neglected, especially by
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disputed the court's jurisdiction."' From the Family Court's deci-
sion that it had jurisdiction, she appealed to the Florida Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal."12
Back in the federal legal arena, the district court declared that
the INS "stay" of deportation was not an abuse of discretion. The
district judge added:
A determination as to the legal custodian of Cynthia is a factor
of the utmost importance as to whether or not she will be de-
ported. For that reason, the guardian ad litem's report supports
the Director's stay to allow further proceedings to determine
what is in the best interests of Cynthia." 3
Having apparently ignored the Fifth Circuit's retention of ju-
risdiction, the Johnses and Mrs. Macias-Rosales then filed a new
appeal from the district court's order upholding the INS Director's
refusal to vacate the stay of deportation and/or to grant temporary
custody to either party. This appeal was handled routinely causing
additional delay.
Mrs. Johns, that she was often locked out of the house for hours during the day, and that
she "urinated in the back yard" if her pleas to get inside were ignored. Id. at 30.
The Catholic Services Bureau (CSB) foster parents reported that the child appeared to
have been pampered, that when she came to them, at age 5, she could not brush her own
hair or buckle her shoes. They also reported that unlike other foster children, she did not
cry for her parents and easily attached herself to them. Id.
Like others involved in the case, the foster parents found "Cindy" loveable. Id. Unlike
the psychiatrists, the foster parents did not observe any significant depression or confusion.
HRS had serious concerns about the Johnses' parenting abilities. The report concluded that:
[I]f we were conducting an adoptive study on them now, we would not select
them as a couple who could properly nurture and guide a child. We would have
to question the very nature of their marriage as it appears not to be a marriage
that is typical or normal. We see their marriage as one in which the husband is
so strong that there is little room for the wife. Consequently, she has been una-
ble to grow or develop and instead is treated as a child. Thus, it would seem
unlikely that they would be able to be adequate role models needed for the de-
velopment of any child. We would be concerned about their ability to handle
their own lives in a rational way. We would even question their emotional stabil-
ity and even something more simple, their financial stability.
Id.
It is ironic that the argument concerning the passage of time and Cynthia's adjustment
to the Johnses, initially put forth to justify the Johnses retaining custody of Cynthia, was
used five years later by CSB in its recommendation that Cynthia not be returned to them.
111. Johns v. Department of Justice, 653 F.2d at 887.
112. Mrs. Macias-Rosales' counsel moved to dismiss the state appeal following Mrs.
Macias-Rosales' "abduction" of her daughter on September 20, 1981. See In re: Custody of
Cynthia Johns, No. 81-949 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June, 1981), dismissed Oct. 19, 1981 (motions
and order granting dismissal of appeal).
113. Johns v. Department of Justice, 653 F.2d at 887-88.
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION
(f) Johns H. In this second appellate review, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the jurisdiction of the federal district court to review the
"stay" of deportation by the INS Director, acting under the dele-
gated authority of the U.S. Attorney General. 1" 4 The appeals court
next attempted to clarify its previous direction with respect to the
duties of Cynthia's guardian ad litem. The court emphasized that
Mr. Klein's duties were restricted to that of "assuring Cynthia due
process [in the deportation proceedings] and to safeguard her best
interests."" 0 The appellate court went on to state that:
It was not our direction that the District Director's decision
await another indefinitely prolonged period of legal thrust and
counter-thrust, but only that Cynthia's due process rights be
protected and her status [with respect to deportation] be adjudi-
cated without delay." 6
The appellate court emphasized that, "[d]elay is an act of injus-
tice to Cynthia, not of mercy,""' (emphasis added).
The appellate court, while stating that it would not "intimate
in the slightest, an opinion of what the [custody] decision should
be," quoted from the Catholic Services Bureau (CSB) report, sub-
mitted as an amicus brief in the Florida state court proceedings, as
follows:
[I]n light of the length of the separation between the child and
the "adoptive" parents [fourteen months] and, importantly, in
view of the material subsequently presented regarding the suita-
bility of the "adoptive" parents, and from CSB's observation
and evaluation of the child during these past months, CSB does
not feel placement with the "adoptive parents" is at all in the
child's best interests .... It is time that those who lament our
system's inability to make Solomonian decisions, stop trying to
make one."8
During August and part of September 1981, while the Johnses
and Mrs. Macias-Rosales' counsel continued to wage their legal
battles in state and federal courts, Mrs. Macias-Rosales arranged
114. Id. at 894-95.
115. Id. at 895 n.26. Federal immigration authorities lack authority to determine cus-
tody of a child. See Huynn Thi Anh v. Levi, 427 F. Supp. 1281, 1286 (E.D. Mich. 1977),
aff'd, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978).
116. Johns v. Department of Justice, 653 F.2d at 894.
117. Id. at 895.
118. Id. at 895 n.31 (citing amicus brief of Catholic Services Bureau, In re: Custody of
Cynthia Johns, No. 80-18409 FC (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Feb. 5, 1981)).
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with the CSB to visit with the child away from the foster home. On
September 20, 1981, Mrs. Macias-Rosales absconded with Cynthia,
presumably to Mexico."O Aside from a motion for contempt filed
against Mrs. Macias-Rosales, 20 all other legal proceedings were
dismissed.'2 1
B. Analysis of the Johns Case
Cynthia Johns was "returned" to her biological mother, not by
operation of law, but by the rule of "seize and run" which the
UCCJA was implemented to correct.12 It is disturbing that the
Johnses never had legal standing to represent Cynthia's rights or
best interests even though they had been able to assert those pa-
rental rights on her behalf until the U.S. Court of Appeals decided
the standing issue.
Mrs. Macias-Rosales located the Johnses when Cynthia was
less than three months old and initiated legal proceedings for her
daughter's return long before the Johnses could have established
themselves as Cynthia's "psychological parents."'' 5 It was the pro-
tracted legal proceedings which afforded the Johnses the opportu-
119. See Ft. Lauderdale, Florida Police Report, Abduction Offense, O.R. No. 81-124002
(Sept. 20, 1981), Johns v. Department of Justice, No. 80-480-Civ-JWK, slip op. (S.D. Fla.
1980).
120. In re: Custody of Cynthia Johns, No. 81-949 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 19,
1981)(Motion and Order Dismissing Appeal).
121. Id.
122. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, prefatory note (1968), 9 U.L.A. 111, 113
(1979).
123. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A.J. SOLNiT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1973)[hereinafter BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD].
The determinations by professionals, with respect to the Johnses as Cynthia's "psycho-
logical parents" did not go far enough. If it is true that psychological parenthood is acquired
from "day-to-day interaction, companionship, and shared experiences," then in all
probability the Johnses were her "psychological parents." Tropic Magazine, supra note 89,
at 19.
The HRS report challenging the Johnses' fitness gives rise to serious questions about
the value of perpetuating that tie.
Where the tie is to adults who are "unfit" as parents, unbroken closeness to
them, and especially identification with them, may cease to be a benefit and
may become a threat.
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, supra, at 19-20 (emphasis added).
Thus, in making determinations about separating children from their "psychological" par-
ents, the parents' fitness should also be an essential factor to be considered.
Taking the parents' fitness into account and deciding that separation, rather than per-
petuation of the tie, is in the child's best interests, is in no way intended to minimize the
painfulness of that separation. "[Slo far as the child's emotions are concerned, interference
with the tie, whether to a 'fit' or 'unfit' psychological parent, is extremely painful." Id. at 20.
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nity to become her psychological parents, to benefit from their
wrong-doing, and to be able to assert their own interests in the
child in a court of law.
There has been only one other case of international child ab-
duction in which the non-relative abductors have been able to as-
sert custody rights in the children they abducted. The case of In re
B.G.,124 involved two children who were born in Czechoslovakia in
1963 and 1964. In August 1968, shortly after the Russian occupa-
tion of Czechoslovakia, the father fled with them to West Germany
where he waited for his wife to join him. After waiting six months
in Munich due to his wife's refusal to accompany him, the father
took his two children, then five and six years old, to live with his
parents in California.' 8 Less than a year after their departure
from Munich, in July 1969, the father died, leaving a "will" in
which he stated that the children should remain in the United
States.112 The children were placed with foster parents who had,
prior to the father's death, provided day care for them. 2 7 In this
case, unlike the Johns case, the children were declared dependent
and custody was awarded to the foster parents by the California
Juvenile Court.'
28
Like Mrs. Macias-Rosales in the Johns case, the mother in In
re B.G., having learned in May, 1969 of the father's illness, made
repeated attempts to have the children returned to her. 2" On No-
vember 4, 1971, a California juvenile court ordered the children
returned to the mother and arrangements were made for their
flight to Czechoslovakia. Like the Johnses who fled to Florida to
avoid Cynthia's deportation, the foster parents in this case, rather
than bringing the children to the airport as had been pre-arranged,
went into hiding with them.180 Like Mrs. Macias-Rosales, the
mother then went to California to retrieve her children. The juve-
nile court found that the mother was a fit parent; ' nonetheless,
the court concluded, as in the Johns case, that "the children had
adapted to living in America . . .had largely forgotten the Czech
124. In re B.G. v. San Bernardino County Welfare Department, 11 Cal. 3d 679, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 444, 523 P.2d 244 (1974).
125. Id. at 683-84, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 446-47, 523 P.2d at 246-47.
126. Id. at 648 n.3, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 447 n.3, 523 P.2d at 247 n.3.
127. Id. at 685, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 447, 523 P.2d at 247.
128. Id. 114 Cal. Rptr. at 448, 523 P.2d at 247.
129. Id., 114 Cal. Rptr. at 448, 523 P.2d at 247.
130. Id. at 685-86, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 448, 523 P.2d at 248.
131. Id. at 686, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 448, 523 P.2d at 248.
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language . . .and that the welfare and best interests of the chil-
dren require that they be continued as dependent children of the
Court and [until a custody determination is made], be detained at
the grandparents' home."'1 3 2 The reasoning of the court is disturb-
ingly similar to that found in the Johnses 1980 Fifth Circuit Ap-
pellate case where the court found that "while Mrs. Macias-
Rosales' personal interest aroused sympathy. . .Cynthia has been
raised in a different culture, speaks a different language, and has
resided for all but the first twenty-four hours of her life with an-
other family . . Under these circumstances, Mrs. Macias-Rosales
does not necessarily represent Cynthia's interests.' ' 3 3 Unlike in the
Johns case, the biological mother's parental rights were not in
question in In re B.G. Rather, the issue in that case was whether
the foster parents, as de facto parents, like the Johnses, had stand-
ing to assert their own interests in the "care, custody and manage-
ment of the child[ren],"'' having in the course of time become her
"psychological parents." The court there, as in Johns, had to de-
cide whether returning the children to the biological parent would
be detrimental, that is, not in the children's "best interests."
In In re B.G., as in Johns, by the time the California Supreme
Court remanded the case for renewed trial proceedings, the chil-
dren had been away from their mother and their native country for
as long as six years. 3 5 Unlike Johns, where the mother employed
self-help, custody in In re B.G. was ultimately awarded by the trial
court to the foster parents, 138 "despite the doctrine of parental
preference."' 1
7
From an examination of the Johns and In re B.G. cases, it is
unquestionable that existing federal and state legislation (i.e. the
PKPA and the UCCJA), is ineffective as a deterrent to interna-
tional child abduction. In fact, the court's application of tradi-
tional recognition and enforcement standards of the law in the
132. Id. at 686-87, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 449, 523 P.2d at 249.
133. Johns v. Department of Justice, 624 F.2d 522, 524 (5th Cir. 1980).
134. 11 Cal. 3d at 692, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 453, 523 P.2d at 254.
135. Bodenheimer, supra note 28, at 96 citing In re B.G., Superior Court of San Ber-
nardino County, California, Nos. J-49661 and J-49662 (Sept. 4, 1974).
136. Id.
137. In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d at 698, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 457, 523 P.2d at 257. The court
recognized that California law [the Family Law Act] expressly "recognizes that custody
should be awarded to parents in preference to non-parents. As between parents it permits
the court to award custody according to the 'best interests of the child,' but in a dispute
between parents and non-parents, the [Act] imposes the additional stipulation that an
award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child." Id.
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aforementioned cases appears to encourage the very self-help mea-
sures it was enacted to prevent.
IV. THE HAGUE CONVENTION
Unlike the UCCJA, the Hague Convention ' "s does not formu-
late recognition and enforcement standards; rather, it requires re-
storing the custody that existed before the abduction.8 9 The
Hague Convention addresses both pre-decree and post-decree ab-
ductions and emphasizes administrative cooperation and the ac-
commodation of non-European countries. 4 0
In his Letter of Transmittal of October 3, 1985, President Rea-
gan succinctly summarized the approach and the effect of the Con-
vention and urged its ratification by the Senate:
The Convention's approach to the problem of international
child abduction is a simple one. The Convention is designed
promptly to restore the factual situation that existed prior to a
child's removal or retention. It does not seek to settle disputes
about legal custody rights, nor does it depend upon the exis-
tence of court orders as a condition for returning children. The
international abductor is denied legal advantage from the ab-
duction to or retention in the country where the child is located,
as resort to the Convention is to effect the child's swift return to
his or her circumstances before the abduction or retention. In
most cases this will mean return to the country of the child's
habitual residence where any dispute about custody rights can
138. Hague Convention, 19 I.L.M. 1501 (1980).
At the Fourteenth Session of the Hague Conference, held in October 1980, representa-
tives of the 28 states present unanimously adopted a Convention on the Civil Aspects of
Child Abduction. The Convention was signed on behalf of Canada, France, Greece and Swit-
zerland. The Convention has been ratified by France, Portugal, Canada and Switzerland. In
addition, Luxembourg, Hungary, and the United Kingdom recently ratified the Convention.
Nat'l L.J., Nov. 24, 1986, at 29 col. 2.
The Convention was signed, but not ratified, by the United States on December 31,
1981. See Responses to International Child Abductions, supra note 7, at 440-41. On Octo-
ber 30, 1985, President Reagan sent a letter of transmittal to the Senate urging ratification
of the Convention. 51 Fed. Reg. 10,495 app. A (Mar. 26, 1986).
The Senate gave its advice and consent on October 9, 1986. President Reagan signed
the instrument of ratification (Executive order) on November 10, 1986; the instrument has
not been deposited internationally. Telephone Interview with George Taft, Esq., Office of
the legal Adviser for Private International Law, U.S. Dep't of State (Dec. 18, 1986)[hereinaf-
ter Taft Interview].
139. Responses to International Child Abduction, supra note 7, at 440. See Hague




be heard and settled. The Convention calls for the establish-
ment of a Central Authority in every Contracting State to assist
applicants in securing the return of their children or in exercis-
ing their custody or visitation rights, and to cooperate and coor-
dinate with their counterparts in other countries toward these
ends. Moreover, the Convention establishes a judicial remedy in
wrongful removal or retention cases which permits an aggrieved
parent to seek a court order for the prompt return of the child
when voluntary agreement cannot be achieved. An aggrieved
parent may pursue both of these courses of action or seek a judi-
cial remedy directly without involving the Central Authority of
the country where the child is located.' 4'
On October 9, 1986, one year after President Reagan sent his
letter of transmittal, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to
the Convention.'" President Reagan signed the instrument of rati-
fication on November 10, 1986.'" s While the United States has rati-
fied the Convention, it has not deposited its instrument of ratifica-
tion internationally.1
4 4
In essence, the Hague Convention is structured to secure the
prompt return of a child under age sixteen 45 who is wrongfully
removed or retained" 6 either before or after an award of custody
by a court has been made. Thus, to order the immediate return of
the child, the court, under the Convention, need only find that (1)
the child was wrongfully removed from his/her habitual resi-
dence, 147 and (2) proceedings were instituted within the Conven-
tion's one-year statute of limitations.'4 8 If a year or more has
passed, the court "shall also order the return of the child, unless it
is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new
environment."1
49
In addition to the "settled in its new environment" exception
after the one-year statute of limitations, the Convention recognizes
three other limited exceptions to the duty of the judicial authority
141. 51 Fed. Reg. 10,495, app. A (Mar. 26, 1986).
142. Taft Interview, supra note 138.
143. Id.
144. Id. "It is expected that the United States will deposit its instrument of ratification
internationally when the implementing legislation is passed, probably early in the 100th
Congress, hopefully by mid-year, 1987." Id.
145. See Hague Convention art. 4.
146. See Hague Convention art. 3.
147. Id.




to order the immediate return of the child. Article 13 of the Con-
vention provides that the judicial authority is not duty-bound to
return the child if the person opposing return establishes that (1)
the person or institution . . having custody of the child was not
exercising it at the time of the abduction or had consented to or
subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention;' or (2) there
is grave risk that the child would be exposed to physical or psycho-
logical harm if returned, or the child would be placed in an intoler-
able situation."' The judicial authority may also refuse to return
the child if the court finds the child is of sufficient age and matur-
ity and the child objects to the return.152 Under Article 13, the bur-
den of proof is on the abductor to prove either of the first two
exceptions.
The third exception to immediate return is stated in Article 20
of the Convention, which provides that the "return of the child
. . .may be refused if this would not be permitted by the funda-
mental principles of the requested State relating to the protection
of human rights and fundamental freedoms."'' 1 Article 20 does not
specify upon whom the burden of proof falls.
Cooperation among governmental authorities is insured
through the establishment of central authorities in each con-
tracting state. 64 Three federal governmental agencies were initially
considered as candidates for central authority in the United States:
(1) the Justice Department, (2) the Department of Health and
Human Services, and (3) the Department of State.3 5 According to
government authorities, the Consular Affairs Bureau of the State
Department will probably be the central authority in the United
States as soon as Congress passes the implementing legislation.'"
150. Hague Convention art. 13(a).
151. Hague Convention art. 13(b).
152. Id.
153. Hague Convention art. 20.
154. Hague Convention arts. 6, 7.
155. Pfund Interview, supra note 7. Mr. Pfund supports the preference for the State
Department as the Central Authority under the Hague Convention on the basis that (1)
cooperative relationships between State and foreign countries already exits; (2) access to
F.B.I. assistance, Parent Locator Services is available to State; and (3) State has been in-
volved in the drafting and analysis of the Convention provisions and in the proposed "im-
plementing" legislation to be submitted to Congress once the Convention is ratified.
156. Taft Interview, supra note 138. According to Taft:
It is anticipated that the Central Authority will be housed in the Consular Af-
fiars Bureau. However, as of now [December 1986], the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is meeting to determine what agency will be the Central Authority.
The choices the Committee is considering are: (1) State Department, (2) Office
19861
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By the terms of the Convention, the central authority is obli-
gated to attempt to effect the voluntary return of the child, 157 and
if that is unsuccessful, it must expeditiously begin legal proceed-
ings.158 The judicial authority in the requested state must reach a
decision within six weeks from the date of the commencement of
the proceedings or if requested, provide a statement of the reasons
for the delay. " Since no dispute is required-or allowed-a judi-
cial determination restoring the child to the status quo prior to the
abduction can be made without lengthy adjudication.
One of the principal weaknesses of the Hague Convention is
that a limited number of states have ratified it. If more interna-
tional support is not achieved, non-participating nations might
well become notorious as havens for children snatchers.160 Another
weakness is the judicial discretion still permitted under the afore-
mentioned exceptions to immediate return. If these exceptions are
too broadly construed by the courts, the purpose of the Conven-
tion-the prompt return of the child-will be significantly diluted.
V. APPLYING THE HAGUE CONVENTION TO THE JOHNS CASE
The Convention was primarily designed to deter international
parental child abductions. Still, it is not inappropriate to apply
the convention provisions to the Johns case, since it was regarded
by U.S. courts as a parental child abduction. Assuming, arguendo,
that both Mexico and the United States are contracting states to
the Hague Convention, Mrs. Macias-Rosales would have applied to
the Mexican central authority with her claim that her child had
been abducted. As Mrs. Macias-Rosales had, in fact, gone to the
Mexican authorities within at least two months after the abduc-
tion, she does not fall into the one-year statute of limitation excep-
tion to the prompt return mandate. Since the Mexican authorities
had already declared the taking wrongful, the U.S. Central Author-
ity, upon locating the child, would have attempted her voluntary
return by the Johnses. If that had failed, a period of six weeks [not
of Management and Budget, (3) Department of Health and Human Services.
Id.
157. Hague Convention art. 10.
158. Hague Convention art. 11.
159. Id. Other articles provide for (1) the enjoyment of access rights (art. 21); and (2)
the apportionment of costs (arts. 26, 42).




six years] of judicial proceedings would have followed in which the
Johnses would have had to be able to prove one of the very limited
exceptions to prompt return. The Johnses would have had to show
proof that the natural mother had consented to the adoption or
that she did not have custody of the child at the time of the ab-
duction or proof of great risk to the child if she were returned.
Failing to prove one of these exceptions, and in the absence of evi-
dence that the United States would bar the child's return to Mex-
ico on the basis of its view of human rights and fundamental free-
doms, Cynthia Johns would have been returned before she reached
five months of age instead of five years.'61
VI. CONCLUSION
The Johns case underscores the need for the United States to
pass the implementing legislation for the Hague Convention in or-
der to serve the "best interests of the child" in cases where chil-
dren are wrongfully removed from their habitual residence or dom-
icile. 162  Implementation of the Hague Convention would
significantly limit the broad judicial discretion which presently ex-
ists. This discretion is responsible in large measure for the pro-
tracted legal proceedings which preclude making any satisfactory
custody determination based on the best interests of the child. The
Convention calls for the prompt return of the child to the status
prior to abduction, thus preventing abductors from benefiting from
their wrong-doing and thereby providing a potent deterrent to in-
ternational child abduction. Based on the near automatic applica-
tion of comity principles, the Convention will eliminate the lengthy
adjudications necessary to determine whether a foreign order is to
be recognized, and once recognized, if it will be enforced. Custody
determinations on the merits are precluded by the Convention's
161. Had the Johnses been the first to file a complaint with the Central Authority in
the United States after Mrs. Macias-Rosales' abduction of Cynthia in September 1981, and
had Mrs. Macias-Rosales never complained to the Mexican authorities about Cynthia's ab-
duction from Mexico, under the Hague provisions, U.S. authorities would have contacted
the Mexican authorities. Assuming that both Mexico and the United States were members
of the Hague Convention, the Mexican authorities, at the request of the U.S. Central Au-
thority would attempt to locate the child and seek her voluntary return. If Mrs. Macias-
Rosales refused to return the child then judicial proceedings would be initiated in the
United States and Mrs. Macias-Rosales would have the burden of proving one of the limited
exceptions to the return of the child to the Johnses.
162. Bodenheimer, The Hague Draft Convention on International Child Abduction, 14
FAM. L.Q. 99, 104 n.25 (1980).
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provisions except if there is grave danger or threat to the child's
freedom or well-being if returned. Thus, the child's prompt return
is virtually assured absent a grave threat to the child's safety and
welfare. It is evident that implementation of the Hague Conven-
tion by the United States and ratification by a significant number
of other nations will be a more effective deterrent to international
child abduction than the existing federal and state legislation.
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